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Abstract
Using British panel data, we explore the nding that households often expect their
nancial position to remain unchanged compared to other alternatives, using a gener-
alised middle inated ordered probit (GMIOP) model. In doing so we account for the
tendency of individuals to choose neutral responses when faced with attitudinal and
opinion-based questions, which are a common feature of survey data. Our empirical
analysis strongly supports the use of a GMIOP model to account for this response
pattern. Expectations indices based on competing discrete choice models are then ex-
ploited to explore the role that nancial expectations play in driving the consumption
of di¤erent types of durable goods and the amount of expenditure undertaken. Whilst
nancial optimism is signicantly associated with consumption, indices which fail to
take into account middle-ination are found to overestimate the impact of nancial
expectations.
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1 Introduction and background
A common feature of survey data is the tendency for individuals to choose neutral responses.
This is particularly so for the case of attitudinal or opinion-based questions, where a sizable
proportion of respondents are inclined to select middle options. Such choices may signal
that the respondent does not know an answer, reect an expectation that things will remain
unchanged, or capture indi¤erence towards the available alternative options.
This phenomenon extends to responses to questions relating to nancial expectations.
For example, a recurring feature of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is respon-
dents predictions that their nancial position will remain about the same the following year,
rather than getting better or worse.1 This is despite the observation that in practice, ex-
pected nancial positions are seldom realised. The consequences of this disparity between
expectations and realisations have been explored in a number of contributions, with a focus
on evaluating the rationality of households nancial expectations (Souleles 2004, Brown
and Taylor 2006, Mitchell and Weale 2007). Such literature forms part of a more general
body of work that sets out to determine whether survey expectations are rational: note-
worthy contributions include work on expectations about future prices (Mankiw et al. 2004,
Madeira and Zafar 2015); rms demand conditions and inventories (Nerlove 1983, Boneva
et al. 2020); and household-level expectations concerning income growth (Das and van Soest
1999, Das et al. 1999).2
However, limited attention has been paid to the distribution of households categorical
responses to expectations based questions, and in the context of this paper, why many house-
holds expect their nancial position to remain unchanged compared to other alternatives.
This paper lls this gap in the literature.3 Our interest is with the BHPS survey question
Looking ahead, how do you think you will be nancially a year from now?,4 where an
overwhelming majority of respondents choose the neutral about the same category. This
response pattern characterises all waves of the BHPS survey, which runs from 1991-2008
covering di¤erent points of the business cycle (See Figure A.1 in Appendix A).
1Other large scale surveys also report similar ndings, such as the University of Michigan Survey of
Consumers.
2Other relevant work includes Pesaran and Weale (2006), Manski (2004) and Pesaran (1987). The seminal
contribution on rational expectations is Muth (1961).
3A number of the above papers comment on the tendency for expectations to be concentrated in a
single category but do not explore the reasons for such a build-up (see for instance: Mitchell and Weale
(2007); Pesaran and Weale (2006); Nerlove (1983) using rm level data; Mankiw et al. (2004) using ination
expectations data). Drawing on contributions from a number of number of di¤erent elds, an early discussion
of the psychological drivers of expectations is Wärneryd (1995).
4This can be interpreted as capturing perceptions of the probability of nancial distress.
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Various reasons may explain this response. One possibility is that an about the same
expectation reects a genuine belief that the nancial position will not worsen or improve
in the near future, due to the realised nancial position exhibiting considerable persis-
tence over time. This may be attributable to the underlying, observed variables that
drive expectationshousehold income, savings, GDP, and so onbeing subject to such
persistence. However, as survey participants may be subject to psychological inuences
(Tourangeau et al. 2000), other candidate mechanisms may drive neutral responses. For
example, a middle alternative may be perceived as representing what is normal (Price et al.
2017), or the safest choice, minimizing the potential for error.
Alternatively, some respondents may engage in satiscing behaviour (Krosnick 1991), in
which the minimum cognitive e¤ort is used to produce a response perceived by the household
to be acceptable to the interviewer (in this case, about the same). Here, perceived question
complexity (Boxall et al. 2009) may also contribute to the presence of status quo bias
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), where individuals choose the option which implies that
things will remain unchanged relative to the current period. Other explanations may entail
choosing the neutral option as a face-saving exercise as in Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012);
unrealistic optimism (Weinstein 1980, Je¤ersona et al. 2017) which would imply that
respondents expect their nancial position to worsen in the future, but still report about no
change;5 or by contrast, a role for defensive pessimism (Ben-Mansour et al. 2006), in which
uncertainty about the future may induce households to expect the worst, or intentionally set
lower expectations for themselves irrespective of past performance or evidence. The presence
of the latter mechanism may clearly be relevant in situations where households have evidence
that nances may improve, but which is disregarded until it is known that it will occur with
absolute certainty.6
We account for the tendency to expect no-change in a households nancial position by
using the recently developed generalised middle-inated ordered probit (GMIOP) model of
Brown et al. (2017).7 This modelling strategy is applicable to situations where a large
5The quintessential denition of unrealistic optimism can be found in Weinstein (1980): According to
popular belief, people tend to think they are invulnerable. They expect others to be victims of misfortune,
not themselves. Such ideas imply not merely a hopeful outlook on life, but an error in judgment that can
be labeled unrealistic optimism. (p.806)
6The notion of unrealistic optimism is most often used in the context of risk decisions where an individual
sees themselves as less likely to experience a negative event than other people (such as smokers thinking the
negative health e¤ects will hit other people, but not them).
7These authors revisit the work of Harris and Zhao (2007), the original paper on the so-called zero-
inated ordered probit (ZIOP) modelwhich explores smoking behaviour using data from the Australian
National Drug Strategy Household Surveyand Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012), who use a middle-inated
ordered probit (MIOP) to model the presence of face-saving middle-category responses in a commonly
studied Eurobarometer survey question. Specication tests reject both these models in favor of the nesting
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proportion of empirical observations fall into a single choice category, which in the context
of our application, is the middle one. In accordance with previous ndings in this growing
literature, failing to account for middle-category ination can lead to model mis-specication,
parameter bias, and incorrect inference (Harris and Zhao 2007, Brown et al. 2017). From
this analysis we are able to obtain a linear prediction of nancial expectations which is purged
(i.e. net) of the e¤ects of ination.
As well as considering expectations formation and ination in the about the same cate-
gory, we also investigate how nancial expectations are associated with both the likelihood
of consumption of di¤erent types of durable goods and the amount of expenditure under-
taken. Browning et al. (2016) use the BHPS to investigate the life-cycle demand patterns for
services from household durable goods, specically white goods or appliances and consumer
electronics. We follow Brown and Taylor (2006) by investigating the relationship between
nancial expectations and consumption behaviour, and in line with Browning et al. (2016)
focus on durable goods decomposing overall expenditure into white goods and electronic
purchases. The BHPS is a rich dataset which contains a number of variables that can be
plausibly assumed to a¤ect reporting behaviour but not nancial expectations, arguably
enabling us to evaluate the causal e¤ect of sentiment (after adjusting for ination) on house-
hold spending behaviour at both the intensive and extensive margins. The results reveal
that specications which do not purge the nancial expectations index of ination tend to
overestimate the e¤ect of sentiment on both the likelihood of undertaking expenditure and
the overall amount spent. These ndings highlight the importance of modelling nancial
expectations appropriately when the distribution of subject responses is characterised by
middle-category ination. Expectations play a key role in our understanding of business
cycles and the design of policy institutions,8 if policy makers are able to inuence beliefs
through monetary or scal policy then economic activity can be manipulated accordingly.
Our work is the rst to show the importance of modelling nancial expectations appropri-
ately by allowing for middle-category ination otherwise the e¤ects on economic activity are
overestimated.
generalised versions proposed in Brown et al. (2017), which preserve the ordering of outcomes.
8Previous research for Europe and the US has shown that consumer sentiment is a pro-cyclical indicator
which can predict the probability of a recession, i.e. key turning points in the business cycle, as well
as quantitatively forecast GDP and its constituent components such as consumer expenditure (Ludvigson
2004, Taylor and McNabb 2007, Christiansen et al. 2014). The role of expectations in forecasting economic
activity is an e¤ect over and above other potential leading indicators.
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2 Modelling middle-ination
Recent advances in discrete choice modelling have witnessed the emergence of statistical
techniques that are able to account for an excess of observations corresponding to a middle
category in an ordered setting. Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012) address this issue by using
a middle-inated ordered probit (MIOP) model. Brown et al. (2017) demonstrate that
under certain parameter restrictions, the MIOP can be nested in a more exible modelling
framework which they call a generalised middle inated ordered probit (GMIOP) model.
We estimate both models, and show that a generalised estimation strategy is favourable.
This has implications for our approach to accounting for the determinants of consumption,
as analysed in Section 4.
In our application, the interviewer asks each individual i a question on nancial expec-
tations, which assumes the form of Looking ahead, how do you think you will be nancially
a year from now? Respondents provide one of three possible answers, which have a nat-
ural ordering: that they will be worse o¤, about the same, or better o¤. These responses
are observed by the econometrician and are respectively coded −1, 0, and 1, to create a
nancial expectations index (eyi). The choice set available to the respondent is thus given byeyi = {−1, 0, 1}. Here, we emphasize that when the distribution of responses across all indi-
viduals is observed, the middle category of eyi = 0 appears inated. As is shown in Figure
A.1 in Appendix A, the about the same response dominates all other categories. The GMIOP
approach assumes that when three response categories are observed, the eyi are generated by
three distinct data generation processes (DGPs), which are all unobserved. These assume
the form of a single ordered probit (OP) equation and two splitting equations, which take
the form of binary probits.
The OP equation is captured by a latent variable y∗i , and specied as a linear in para-
meters function of a vector of observed characteristics zi, with unknown weights γ and a
random normal disturbance term εyi:
y∗i = z
′
iγ + εyi. (1)
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Expression (1) is dened by
yi =


−1 if y∗i ≤ 0
0 if 0 ≤ y∗i ≤ 1
1 if 1 ≤ y∗i
(2)
where 0 and 1 are threshold parameters to be estimated such that 0 < 1, and correspond
to an underlying propensity to select the observed responses of worse o¤, about the same, or
better o¤. Outcome probabilities for yi are determined by the model in expressions (1) and
(2) viz.,
Pr (yi) =


−1 = Φ (0 − z′iγ)
0 = [Φ (1 − z′iγ)− Φ (0 − z′iγ)]
1 = [1− Φ (1 − z′iγ)]
(3)
where Φ() denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the normal distribution.
To allow for the observed build-up of about the same responses, we allow for the propensi-
ties to select the better o¤ or worse o¤ responses in y∗ to be tempered by the two splitting
equations. These latent equations have the e¤ect of pushing respondents away from select-
ing better o¤ or worse o¤ in expression (1) towards the middle outcome. In this way, the
observed about the same category eyi = 0 is inated. These two latent variables are specied
as
w∗i = x
′
iβw + εiw; b
∗
i = x
′
iβb + εib, (4)
where xi is a vector of observed characteristics, βw and βb are parameter vectors, and εiw and
εib are random normal disturbances. Conditional on having a propensity to select worse o¤
in y∗i , a value of wi = 1 entails that the respondent chooses worse o¤ over the about the same
category, which is assigned a value of wi = 0. Similarly, conditional on having a propensity
to select better o¤ in y∗i , a value of bi = 1 entails that the respondent chooses better o¤ over
the about the same category, which is assigned a value of bi = 0. The probabilities that a
respondent is steered away from selecting worse o¤ or better o¤ responses towards the about
the same outcome are given, respectively, by
Pr (wi = 0) = Φ (−x′iβw) ; Pr (bi = 0) = Φ (−x′iβb) . (5)
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Our assumption is that the same block of variables xi drives each of these splitting equations.
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As the y∗i and w
∗
i equations relate to the same set of individuals, as do the y
∗
i and b
∗
i
equations, it is very likely that the unobservables in these equations will be correlated, with
correlation coe¢cients ρyw and ρyb, respectively.
10 The overall probabilities of individual i
having nancial expectations that are worse o¤, about the same and better o¤ are given by
Pr (eyi) =


Pr (eyi = −1 |zi,xi ) = Φ2  0 − z′iγ,x′iβw;−ρyw
Pr (eyi = 0 |zi,xi ) =


[Φ (1 − z′iγ)− Φ (0 − z′iγ)]
+Φ2
 
0 − z′iγ,−x′iβw; ρyw

+Φ2
 
z
′
iγ − 1,−x′iβb;−ρyb

Pr (eyi = 1 |zi,xi ) = Φ2  z′iγ − 1,x′iβb; ρyb
(6)
where Φ2 (a, b; ρ) represents the standardised bivariate normal cumulative distribution func-
tion. We refer to the model in expression (6) as GMIOPC ; the model under indepen-
dent errors (i.e., setting ρyw = ρyb = 0) is denoted GMIOP. The probability of an about
the same response comprises three distinct terms in the eyi = 0 category: the probability
of an about the same expectation arising in the OP equation, as captured by the term
[Φ (1 − z′iγ)− Φ (0 − z′iγ)]; and the probabilities arising as a result of being steered away
from the yi = −1 (worse o¤ ) and yi = 1 (better o¤ ) outcomes in (1), which are respectively
given by Φ2
 
0 − z′iγ,−x′iβw; ρyw

and Φ2
 
z
′
iγ − 1,−x′iβb;−ρyb

. The variables entering
xi and zi are discussed below. The log likelihood function for the GMIOP model is shown
in the Appendix B.
To shape intuition, Figure 1(a) depicts the GMIOP model. An interpretation of this
gure is that during each interview, respondents are faced with choosing worse o¤, about the
same, or better o¤ when asked about their nancial expectations. Clearly, one approach to
modelling this decision is to employ a standard OP specication as in expressions (1)(3).
However, such a modelling strategy neglects the possibility that decisions to select an about
the same response may derive from more than a single data generating process, thereby
giving rise to the presence of the splitting equations in (4), also depicted in Figure 1(a). The
impact of these equations is to allow respondents to be steered away from choosing worse o¤
9It would be possible to allow di¤erent variables to a¤ect the tempering on the better o¤ and worse o¤
propensities in y∗i , but this seems di¢cult to justify on a priori grounds.
10This is not the case for the w∗i and b
∗
i equations: these instead relate to two distinct sets of individuals,
namely those in worse and better propensities, respectively.
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Figure 1: The Generalised Middle-Inated Ordered Probit model (GMIOP) and its nested
variant (MIOP)
or better o¤ towards selecting about the same.11 In this sense, the expressions in (4) could
also be termed ination equations, due to their role in inating the middle category. As
a counterpoint to the GMIOP, the MIOP framework of Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012) is
illustrated in Figure 1(b). AMIOP model has a single splitting equation which captures the
propensity of households to choose an about the same response over all other alternatives
(worse o¤, better o¤ ).12 This latent equation, which takes the form of a binary probit, is
given by
q∗i = x
′
iβ + εiq, (7)
where xi is the same vector of observed characteristics in (4), β is a parameter vector, and εiq
is a random normal disturbance.13 Expression (7) is estimated simultaneously with an OP
11Whether or not respondents are steered towards the about the same outcome is identied by the data,
rather than being imposed by the modelling approach.
12A principal di¤erence between the MIOP and GMIOP models is therefore that the former framework
is driven by two DGPs, the latter model is characterised by three: that is, in addition to an about the same
response emanating from the OP equation, it can arise from the tempered equations for better o¤ or worse
o¤, respectively. This type of observational equivalence is also depicted in Figure 1. We stress here that
whilst both models have a single OP equation, a key di¤erence between the GMIOP and MIOP is that the
former has J1 splitting equations when the model has J outcomes, whereas the MIOP has a single splitting
equation.
13Harris and Zhao (2007) refer to this type of latent variable as a splitting equation which is assumed to
be a linear in parameters (β) function of a vector of observed characteristics x and a random error term.
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equation identical to that used in the GMIOP framework, as described by expressions (1)
(3). Relaxing the assumption that the error terms are independent leads to the correlated
variant of the MIOP, which following Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012), is termed MIOPC. For
observations in regime qi = 0, the inated about the same outcome is observed; but for those
in qi = 1 any of the possible responses in our choice set {worse o¤ , about the same, better
o¤ } are feasible. Membership of either regime (qi = 0, qi = 1) is not directly observed, and
this relationship is identied during estimation by the data.
The model depicted in Figure 1(a) can nest the non-generalised model depicted in Figure
1(b). As noted, Brown et al. (2017) demonstrate that the generalised model can collapse
to a non-generalised variant under certain parameter restrictions. For instance, restricting
βw = βb = β and ρw = ρb = ρ in the GMIOPC collapses it to the MIOPC. Additionally
setting ρ = 0 imposes an independent error structure to the non-generalised model, and
collapses the GMIOPC to the MIOP. Likelihood ratio tests with degrees of freedom given
by the number of extra parameters can be performed to test between these nested model
variants; the results of these tests are used to inform model selection. A proof of the nested
nature of these model variants is provided in Appendix C.14
3 Modelling nancial expectations
We use data from the BHPS, a longitudinal study which took place over the period 1991
to 2008, and was conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic Research. The BHPS
is a nationally representative survey of 5,500 households covering over 10,000 individuals
per year, collecting wide-ranging socio-economic and demographic information on household
members. Our analysis is performed on a balanced panel composed of 24,089 observations
(NT ) covering 1,417 individuals (N ) over an eighteen year period (T ) who are of working
age (18-65 years).15
The rst part of our empirical analysis models the individuals response to the following
question which elicits information on nancial expectations: Looking ahead, how do you
think you will be nancially a year from now? Respondents indicate whether they think
they will be worse o¤, about the same, or better o¤. As stated above, these responses
are respectively coded −1, 0 and +1 to create a nancial expectations index (ey), where
approximately 11% of those surveyed responded worse o¤, 61% reported about the same and
14For the more general case of j = 1, 2, ..., J outcomes see Brown et al. (2017).
15We explain below why the focus is on a balanced panel.
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28% responded better o¤. Hence, it would appear that there is ination in the reporting
of nancial expectations in that the dominant category corresponds to the about the same
response and this is prevalent over time (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). In the rst part of
our analysis, ey constitutes the dependent variable.
Following the existing literature (see for example Souleles 2004), nancial expectations
are conditioned on the following individual and household covariates: the age of the indi-
vidual, as captured by binary indicators corresponding to whether the respondent is aged
18-30, 31-40 and 41-50, where 51 years of age and above comprises the reference category;
gender; highest educational attainment, namely whether a degree (undergraduate or higher
degree), a teaching or nursing qualication (or another degree level equivalent qualication),
A-levels, O-levels (GCSE), and any other qualication achieved, with no education being
the omitted category. We additionally control for information on respondents personal-
ity traits made available in 2005, namely the Big Fiveagreeableness, conscientiousness,
extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience. Controls are also included for the
number of children in a household; whether the individual is married or cohabiting; eth-
nicity, delineated in terms of whether an individual is white, black or Asian, where other
ethnic groups form the reference category; and labour market status, which distinguishes
between whether the respondent is an employee, self-employed, or unemployed, with not
in the labour market as the omitted group. In terms of monetary variables (which are
all deated to 1991 prices), we control for the natural logarithm of: labour income in the
previous month; non-labour income in the previous month (e.g., benet income); savings
made during the last month in a post o¢ce or equivalent instant access account; and wealth
based upon the individuals estimate of their house value. Housing tenure is included as a
control, and captures whether the home is owned outright; owned via a mortgage; or rented.
Other control variables used in our strategy for modelling nancial expectations comprise:
the caseness subjective well-being score from the general health questionnaire (GHQ-12);16
an index capturing how the individual perceives their job security, where 0 corresponds to
not in paid employment, and values one through seven, respectively correspond to levels
of satisfaction for those in employment, ranging from not satised at all to completely
satised. Regional unemployment (dened at the government o¢ce region) is also included
as a covariate to account for regional macroeconomic shocks, in addition a time trend is
incorporated.
16This covers various dimensions, including: depression; anxiety; somatic symptoms; feelings of incompe-
tence; di¢culty in coping; and sleep disturbance. The GHQ-12 score is on the scale 0 (the least distressed)
through to 12 (the most distressed).
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As well as asking individuals about their nancial expectations for the future, in each
wave respondents are also asked about their current nancial situation relative to the previous
year. Specically, individuals are asked: Would you say that you yourself are nancially
worse o¤, about the same, or better o¤ than you were a year ago? These responses are
used to dene a three-point nancial realisations index (R): worse o¤  responses are coded
−1, neither worse o¤ nor better o¤  responses are coded 0, whilst better o¤  responses
are coded 1. Exploiting the responses to this question at time t and the responses to
the nancial expectations question at t1, we then dene whether an individuals nancial
expectation made in the previous year was realised, by creating the following variable,
Error it = eyit−1 −Rit. (8)
This variable is based upon individuals responses to nancial realisations. Specically, in-
dividuals are asked to assess their current nancial situation relative to the previous year.17
Error it can take the value −2,−1, 0,+1,+2, where negative values indicate that the respon-
dent was too pessimistic with respect to their nancial expectations, and positive values
indicate being over optimistic (Souleles 2004). A value of zero indicates that expectations
have been realised.
Individuals are also asked at time t to specify why their nancial situation changed be-
tween time t1 and t. This additional information is exploited to dene four binary variables
corresponding to whether income and/or expenditure changes, both of which may be posi-
tive or negative, occur.18 A positive income change occurs if the individual experiences an
income increase during the past twelve months stemming from earnings (i.e., labour income),
benets, investment income, and/or a windfall. Conversely, a negative income change occurs
when an individuals income from any one of the aforementioned sources falls. Turning to
expenditure changes, expenditure is dened to have increased if the individual experiences
greater expenses during the past twelve months or experiences a one-o¤ expenditure increase.
Expenditure is dened to have fallen if the individual reports lower expenses in response to
why their nancial situation changed.
These terms are then interacted with Error it to create shock terms. These are labelled as
17It is also possible to dene how an individuals current nancial situation has changed relative to the
previous year by analysing how their income changed over time. We have also conducted our analysis using
this approach, and our ndings remained unchanged.
18In related work, Coco et al. (2019) also distinguish between the main reasons that led to the change
in household nances: an increase/decrease in income or higher/lower expenditure. They examine both
expected and realised changes in individual nances examining expectation formation and expectation errors,
controlling for individual xed e¤ects.
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Income shock up (Error it× nancial situation changed as income went up); Income shock
down (Error it × nancial situation changed as income went down); Expenditure shock up
(Error it × nancial situation changed as expenditure went up); Expenditure shock down
(Error it × nancial situation changed as expenditure went down). Explicitly capturing
income or expenditure shocks as a non-zero value of Error it means that the expectation at
t1 regarding the nancial situation at t was incorrect: hence the individual at t1 did not
anticipate the income or expenditure change as measured at t.
In terms of modelling ination, we condition on a subset of the above variables (namely:
age; gender; highest educational attainment and the Big Five personality traits). For exam-
ple, individuals attitudes  captured by personality traits  may inuence ination and/or
the better-educated are likely to be more informed about their nancial situation and future
nances. Additional covariates include: the number of times that the individual has been
correctly optimistic in the panel (i.e. over 18 years); the number of times that the individual
has correctly forecast no change in nancial situation in the panel; and the number of times
that the individual has been correctly pessimistic in the panel. This is why the data set is
balanced; specically, the literature on panel conditioning suggests that responses to survey
questions may be inuenced by the number of times respondents are observed (e.g. Williams
and Mallows 1970; Das et al. 2011). This may be particularly important in measuring fore-
cast accuracy. Other controls include proxies for interview conditions which may inuence
responses, namely: the number of problems a¤ecting the interview, e.g. language, reading,
interpretation etc.; and whether other individuals were present during the interview.19 Fol-
lowing the existing literature we also include proxies for the level of trust that individuals
may have in the questionnaire (which can inuence survey responses). The measures we use
are the amount of time the interview took in minutes and whether there has been a change
in the interviewer between waves (e.g. Corbin and Morse 2003; Niccoletti and Peracchi 2005;
and Vassallo et al. 2015).20 A higher level of trust in the questionnaire and/or interviewer
may engender a more accurate/realistic response from the interviewee rather than replying
that the nancial situation will not change, i.e. a neutral response. Summary statistics are
provided in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
19If others were present during the interview then the respondent may opt to give a neutral response in
order to save-face (recall the discussion in Section 1).
20The literature has shown that the longer a respondent spends time with the interviewer the more trusting
they are of both him/her and the survey in general. Similarily, interviewer continuation is associated with
respondent trust, interviewer reputation and rapport with the respondent, and hence continued survey
participation over time.
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Table 1: Modelling Financial Expectations  Model Diagnostics
Model AIC BIC LogL
1. Panel OP 39, 864.25 40, 276.82 −19, 881.13
2. MIOP 38, 474.45 39, 064.99 −19, 164.23
3. Panel MIOP 37, 527.55 38,142.35 −18, 687.77
4. MIOPC 38, 433.57 39, 032.19 −19, 142.79
5. Panel MIOPC 37, 521.02 38, 143.91 −18, 683.51
6. GMIOP 38, 200.24 38, 968.74 −19, 005.12
7. Panel GMIOP 37, 477.62 38, 294.66 −18, 637.81
8. GMIOPC 38, 124.59 38, 909.27 −18, 965.29
9. Panel GMIOPC 37,433.89 38, 267.11 −18,613.94
Note: Smaller AIC and BIC values indicate an improved model t. The smallest value for each respective
summary statistic is highlighted in bold.
3.1 Estimation results
To ascertain the desirability of using a generalised MIOP estimation strategy, we estimate
a number of competing specications. These comprise a panel OP model, and pooled and
panel variants of the MIOP, MIOPC, GMIOP, and GMIOPC models.21 As shown in Table
1, which reports the corresponding log-likelihoods and the Akaike and Bayesian Information
Criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively) for these models, the panel OP model performs least
well, which lends support to an estimation approach that explicitly accounts for middle-
ination. Here, we observe that the panel inated models perform better than those where
the data are pooled. However, whilst the AIC measure points to the panel GMIOPC as
being the preferred model, the BIC suggests that the panel MIOP performs best.
To resolve the ambiguity regarding model selection we appeal to the specication tests
described in Section 2, under which the imposition of linear parameter restrictions enables
the testing of nested versus non-nested variants of theMIOP models.22 Restricting our focus
to the panel variants, Table 2 presents the LR test results. TheMIOP,MIOPC, and GMIOP
are all overwhelmingly rejected in favour of the GMIOPC. Using a GMIOPC framework thus
appears to be a more appropriate modelling strategy. This result aligns with the evidence
for the AIC reported in Table 1.
To help shape intuition about the implications of using a generalised model over a non-
generalised variant, Table 3 presents the output equation parameters for the GMIOPC and
21In the panel specications to account for unobserved heterogeneity we include random e¤ects, see Ap-
pendix B. In addition the mean of time varying covariates are incorporated as controls, see Mundlak (1978).
By doing this in a random e¤ects framework the parameter estimates then approximate those of a xed
e¤ects estimator, see Wooldridge (2010).
22Note, the OP model is non-nested; that is, it is not possible to collapse any MIOP variant to an ordered
probit model by the imposition of linear parameter restrictions. Further, it is not possible to undertake an
LR test for GMIOP versus MIOPC, as neither model nests the other.
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Table 2: Specication test results: competing MIOP models
Model (nesting vs. nested)
Test
statistic
df p-value
GMIOPC vs. GMIOP 47.74 2 p < 0.001
GMIOPC vs. MIOPC 139.14 24 p < 0.001
GMIOPC vs. MIOP 147.66 25 p < 0.001
GMIOP vs. MIOP 99.92 23 p < 0.001
MIOPC vs. MIOP 8.52 1 p < 0.01
Notes: df denotes degree of freedom. Reported p-values of p < 0.01 and p < 0.001 indicate rejections of the
null hypothesis of no di¤erence between the nesting and nested models below the 0.01 and 0.001 levels of
signicance, respectively.
MIOPC models. For comparative purposes, we also present results for the panel OP model,
which includes identical variables to those in the output equations. There are clear di¤erences
in the structural parameters across these specications. Whilst the MIOPC and GMIOPC
results are qualitatively very similar, both in sign and signicance,23 some di¤erences do
arise. For example, whereas some parameters associated with being in a particular age
cohort are large and signicant in the GMIOPC, this is not the case for the MIOPC, where
all age group variables are statistically insignicant. Compared to the panel OP equation,
we observe that outcome equation variables which also appear in the MIOPC and GMIOPC
splitting equations have opposite signs. In addition to this di¤erence, the impact of the
shock-based variables appear to be far more pronounced in the panel OP model.
The parameter estimates for the single splitting equation of the MIOPC, and the two
splitting equations of the GMIOPC specication, are presented in Table 4. For the GMIOPC
we observe asymmetries in the form of di¤erent parameter estimates across the worse o¤ (w∗i )
and better o¤ (b∗i ) equations. This reects our rejection of the restriction that βw = βb = β
in Table 2, which is imposed as part of the specication test ofGMIOPC versusMIOPC.24 As
shown in Tables 3 and 4, all estimated models are also characterised by a considerable degree
of unobserved heterogeneity and statistically signicant correlated errors. An exception to
this general nding relates to the ination equation for a worse o¤ expectation (w∗), where
the random e¤ects parameter (σ2w) is insignicant.
However, as the coe¢cients in an OP model, and by extension all varieties of the MIOP
and GMIOP have no direct interpretation, our discussion focuses on the partial e¤ects of
our preferred GMIOPC specication.25 These e¤ects measure precisely how changes in the
23Where variables are statistically signicant in both regressions, the size of the standard errors of many
of these parameters suggests that the estimated model coe¢cients may not be statistically di¤erent to each
other, based on the construction of condence intervals at conventional levels of statistical signicance.
24The restriction that βw = βb = β is imposed jointly with the additional restriction that ρw = ρb = ρ.
25Full estimation results for all model variants are available from the authors on request.
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regressors a¤ect our dependent variable, ey, and are evaluated at the means of our regressors.
Due to the joint nature of the GMIOPC model, care needs to be taken when assessing the
impact of a change in a variable on ey. Appendix D derives the analytical expressions for the
overall partial e¤ects evaluated here, the estimates of which are reported for our preferred
specication in Table 5. Table 5 also reports the partial e¤ects for the two splitting equations
for the GMIOPC model, evaluated at sample means.
For the splitting equation parameters reported in Table 4, a positively signed coe¢cient
is indicative of a variable being associated with a movement away from an about the same
response towards worse o¤ (as captured by the w∗ ination equation) or better o¤ (as
captured by the b∗ ination equation). Here although the marginal e¤ects for a number of
variables are strongly signicant and appear sizable in the w∗ and b∗ equations in Table 5, the
direction of these e¤ects may be dampenedand even reversedonce the overall marginal
e¤ects are considered. This does not mean that the impact of the splitting equations is
limited. To see why, we note that decomposing the overall partial e¤ect of an about the same
response into its constituent parts is given by
∂ Pr (ey = 0) /∂x∗ =


A: y∗i equation (about the same)z }| {
∂ [Φ (1 − z′iγ)− Φ (0 − z′iγ)]
∂x∗
+
∂Φ2
 
0 − z′iγ,−x′iβw; ρyw

∂x∗| {z }
B: Steering to about the same
from w∗i eqn.
+
∂Φ2
 
z
′
iγ − 1,−x′iβb;−ρyb

∂x∗| {z }
C: Steering to about the same
from b∗i eqn.
(9)
where the matrix x∗ encompasses xi and zi. Evaluating the total partial e¤ects of the
GMIOPC model requires taking the latent equations into account. More saliently, even if
the partial e¤ect of being steered towards about the same from a propensity to choose worse
o¤ in the OP equation is positive and largeas captured by term A in expression (9)this
e¤ect may be o¤set by negative values of terms B and C. Smaller or dampened overall partial
e¤ects do not therefore imply that the impacts of the respective splitting equations play no
role in shaping respondents answers.
Turning to the individual splitting equation variables in Table 5 rst, whereas the impact
of being in a younger age cohort is to push individuals towards choosing worse o¤ in w∗i ,
with the magnitude of this e¤ect decreasing with age, an opposing e¤ect is revealed in the
splitting equation for better o¤ (b∗i ). Individuals younger than 51 years of age (the omitted
category) with a propensity to select better o¤ in the latent OP equation are relatively
more likely to be pushed towards an about the same response. This e¤ect di¤ers from
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that implied by the MIOPC splitting equation in Table 4, which indicates that younger
individuals are less prone to being pushed towards the inated middle category. In this sense,
the single MIOPC splitting equation masks the range of distinct impacts associated with
being pushed away from di¤erent non-inated outcomes in the generalised framework. The
overall marginal e¤ects indicate that being in younger age cohorts increases (decreases) the
likelihood of choosing better o¤ (worse o¤ ), a statistically signicant e¤ect which disappears
for individuals aged 41 years or over.
In the MIOPC splitting equation in Table 4, the impact of educational attainment is
prima facie suggestive of respondents engaging in satiscing behaviour (Krosnick 1991),
where minimum cognitive e¤ort is used to produce a response perceived by the household
to be acceptable to the interviewer (in this case, about the same). This theory argues that
individuals with less education are more likely to satisce (i.e., in our application, being
pushed towards the middle outcome), when faced with a challenging question. Specically,
the positive (and signicant) parameters for individuals with the highest levels of education
in theMIOPC splitting equation seem to conrm this e¤ect, with university graduates being
least prone to satiscing, relative to individuals with no-education. However, whilst similar
e¤ects are observed in the better o¤ splitting equation for the GMIOPC model, satiscing
behaviour does not characterise the behaviour of individuals with a propensity to choose
worse o¤ in the latent OP equation. On the contrary, relative to having no education,
individuals with low levels of educational attainment are likely to be pushed away from an
about the same response.26 This is captured by the marginal e¤ects in Table 5.27 Overall,
the impact of educational attainment is limited to A-level, Degree, and Teaching/Nursing.
All of these statistically signicant impacts are associated with increasing the probability of
selecting better o¤, largely at the expense of selecting about the same.
While the role of the Big Five personality traits is limited and restricted to Openness
to experience, two out of the three variables which capture the precision of individuals
expectation forecasts across the entire sample period are statistically signicant: namely
correct pessimistic; and correct same. The estimated splitting equation partial e¤ects in
b∗i and w
∗
i suggest that individuals with a greater ability to make correct forecasts associated
with choosing worse o¤ and about the same, respectively, are likely to be steered towards
26Overall, this would refute the presence of satiscing behaviour. If present, the e¤ect should manifest
itself irrespective of whether individuals have a propensity to choose worse o¤ or better o¤ in the latent OP
equation.
27This example shows that where high statistical signicance levels for a variable are observed in aMIOPC
splitting equation, such e¤ects will not necessarily be observed across all of the splitting equations of the
GMIOPC model.
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these respective outcomes. This nding is reinforced when observing the overall partial
e¤ects of the model. Finally, variables related to interview characteristics are generally
insignicant when considering the overall partial e¤ects, despite being signicant in the
splitting equations. An exception is the impact of a change in interviewer, which is associated
with increasing the probability of choosing better o¤.
Turning to selected variables unique to the latent OP equation, we observe some interest-
ing e¤ects. The partial e¤ects associated with Error it imply that individuals whose nancial
realisations were not met in the previous period will report nancial expectations in line
with the nature of these errors: being overly optimistic (pessimistic) in the previous period
will lead to an individual having a better o¤ (worse o¤ ) expectation. In the case of income,
a 1% increase in labour income leads to the overall probability of selecting worse o¤ (better
o¤ ) increasing by approximately 0.028 (0.059) percentage points. Here, the inclusion of the
means of time varying covariateswhich includes those for income over the sample period
implies that individuals with atypically high income in a particular year often expect an
income fall. An expected change in transitory income is thus negatively related to the level
of transitory income.28 Higher savings are also associated with a higher (lower) likelihood
of choosing worse o¤ (better o¤ ). An interpretation of this nding is that if the saving is
precautionary in nature, it reects an expectation that the individual will be worse o¤ in
the future, which is reected in the survey response.
Interestingly, ethnicity has no impact, whereas the e¤ect of employment status is mixed.
Regarding the GHQ-12 variable, the most distressed individuals have a greater tendency
to choose worse o¤. Lastly, the signs on the income up / down and expenditure up /
down variables suggest that an income increase is associated with a tendency to be more
nancially optimistic. An expenditure increase (decrease) is associated with a lower (higher)
probability of being better o¤ (worse o¤ ) by 11 (11.2) percentage points. Turning to the
statistically signicant interaction e¤ects (Error it×Income up, Error it×Expenditure down),
the estimated parameters suggest that if income decreasesor expenditure increasesthe
probability of having a nancial expectation consistent with the direction of the Error it
index increases, i.e. the magnitude of the forecast error is amplied.
Finally, it is informative to quantify the extent to which respondents nancial expec-
tations are attributable to the ination equations. Table 6 presents a series of estimated
model probabilities averaged over all individuals, where the extent to which ination e¤ects
contribute to each categorical outcome is quantied. Such e¤ects are obtained by estimat-
28For a similar nding in the context of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), see Das and van Soest
(1999).
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Table 3: Modelling Financial Expectations − Ordered Probit Equations for Panel Models
OP MIOPC GMIOPC
Aged 18-30 0.353 (0.036)∗∗∗ 0.075 (0.073) −0.193 (0.125)
Aged 31-40 0.178 (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.040 (0.056) −0.396 (0.109)∗∗∗
Aged 41-50 0.083 (0.022)∗∗∗ 0.048 (0.041) −0.238 (0.093)∗∗∗
Male 0.041 (0.018)∗∗ −0.018 (0.044) −0.087 (0.067)
Degree 0.079 (0.027)∗∗ −0.030 (0.079) −0.087 (0.135)
Teaching/Nursing 0.046 (0.034) 0.116 (0.068)∗ −0.085 (0.127)
A-level 0.065 (0.033)∗ 0.032 (0.075) −0.118 (0.138)
O-level 0.056 (0.028)∗∗ 0.112 (0.069) −0.141 (0.131)
Other education 0.003 (0.033) 0.116 (0.087) −0.328 (0.150)∗∗
Agreeableness 0.001 (0.008) 0.024 (0.020) −0.033 (0.032)
Openness to experience 0.054 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.036 (0.021) 0.128 (0.033)∗∗∗
Neuroticism −0.019 (0.008)∗∗ −0.030 (0.021) −0.020 (0.033)
Conscientiousness −0.014 (0.009) −0.017 (0.019) 0.007 (0.032)
Extraversion 0.014 (0.009)∗ 0.014 (0.020) −0.023 (0.033)
Number of children 0.033 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.075 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.058 (0.013)∗∗∗
Married −0.072 (0.022)∗∗∗ −0.127 (0.034)∗∗∗ −0.093 (0.031)∗∗∗
White −0.100 (0.107) −0.271 (0.232) −0.190 (0.204)
Black 0.335 (0.156)∗∗ 0.188 (0.455) 0.188 (0.325)
Asian −0.104 (0.125) −0.237 (0.293) −0.200 (0.256)
Employed −0.195 (0.039)∗∗∗ −0.214 (0.054)∗∗∗ −0.192 (0.048)∗∗∗
Self employed −0.026 (0.045) 0.040 (0.067) 0.188 (0.061)
Unemployed 0.391 (0.069)∗∗∗ 0.459 (0.075)∗∗∗ 0.435 (0.069)∗∗∗
Owned outright −0.218 (0.045)∗∗∗ −0.179 (0.066)∗∗∗ −0.199 (0.058)∗∗∗
Mortgage −0.064 (0.041) −0.012 (0.057) −0.030 (0.050)
Rent −0.110 (0.043)∗∗∗ −0.103 (0.065) −0.088 (0.057)
Log labour income −0.149 (0.060)∗∗ −0.199 (0.084)∗∗ −0.194 (0.071)∗∗∗
Log non-labour income −0.073 (0.056) −0.163 (0.075)∗∗ −0.146 (0.065)∗∗
Log savings −0.227 (0.042)∗∗∗ −0.322 (0.052)∗∗∗ −0.276 (0.047)∗∗∗
Log wealth −0.078 (0.125) −0.274 (0.159)∗ −0.227 (0.146)
GHQ-12 −0.126 (0.029)∗∗∗ −0.254 (0.037)∗∗∗ −0.197 (0.034)∗∗∗
Job satisfaction 0.051 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.065 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.056 (0.007)∗∗∗
Regional UE −0.001 (0.056) 0.004 (0.091) 0.017 (0.081)
Time trend 0.728 (0.099)∗∗∗ 1.245 (0.142)∗∗∗ 0.984 (0.140)∗∗∗
Error it 0.248 (0.018)
∗∗∗ 0.145 (0.021)∗∗∗ 0.147 (0.020)∗∗∗
Income up 0.632 (0.029)∗∗∗ 0.464 (0.040)∗∗∗ 0.439 (0.038)∗∗∗
Income down −0.151 (0.054)∗∗∗ 0.069 (0.058) 0.078 (0.055)
Expenditure up −0.603 (0.049)∗∗∗ −0.391 (0.048)∗∗∗ −0.362 (0.046)∗∗∗
Expenditure down 0.510 (0.061)∗∗∗ 0.368 (0.069)∗∗∗ 0.370 (0.063)∗∗∗
Error it×Income up 0.180 (0.036)∗∗∗ 0.059 (0.044) 0.058 (0.040)
Error it×Income down 0.218 (0.048)∗∗∗ 0.175 (0.051)∗∗∗ 0.161 (0.048)∗∗∗
Error it×Expenditure up 0.221 (0.044)∗∗∗ 0.124 (0.041)∗∗∗ 0.124 (0.038)∗∗∗
Error it×Expenditure down 0.001 (0.068) −0.099 (0.081) −0.067 (0.072)
0 −1.210 (0.188)∗∗∗ −1.636 (0.374)∗∗∗ −1.090 (0.368)∗∗
1 0.776 (0.185)
∗∗∗ −0.541 (0.377) −0.484 (0.259)∗
Correlation coe¢cients
ρ −0.468 (0.073)∗∗∗
ρyw 0.540 (0.106)
∗∗∗
ρyb −0.564 (0.102)∗∗∗
Random e¤ects
σ2y 0.228 (0.013)
∗∗∗ 0.237 (0.021)∗∗∗ 0.156 (0.032)∗∗∗
Notes: Number of observations is 24,089 for all models. Coe¢cients are reported with standard errors in
parenthesis; ∗ signicant at 10% level; ∗∗ signicant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level; following Mundlak
(1978) we include throughout the means of individual time-varying variables (not reported here) to account
for xed e¤ects.
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Table 4: Modelling Financial Expectations  Ination Equations for Panel Models
MIOPC GMIOPC
q∗i b
∗
i w
∗
i
Aged 18-30 0.634 (0.074)∗∗∗ 1.041 (0.212)∗∗∗ −0.137 (0.180)
Aged 31-40 0.239 (0.048)∗∗∗ 0.845 (0.144)∗∗∗ −0.490 (0.151)∗∗∗
Aged 41-50 0.059 (0.038) 0.363 (0.104)∗∗∗ −0.331 (0.122)∗∗∗
Male 0.171 (0.049)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.099) 0.212 (0.090)∗∗
Degree 0.341 (0.089)∗∗∗ 0.459 (0.161)∗∗∗ 0.057 (0.177)
Teaching/Nursing 0.146 (0.071)∗∗ 0.404 (0.140)∗∗∗ −0.206 (0.163)
A-level 0.162 (0.085)∗ 0.379 (0.173)∗∗ −0.129 (0.181)
O-level 0.058 (0.078) 0.357 (0.156)∗∗ −0.303 (0.169)∗
Other education −0.107 (0.093) 0.488 (0.214)∗ −0.525 (0.191)∗∗∗
Agreeableness −0.020 (0.024) 0.055 (0.045) −0.076 (0.044)∗
Openness to experience 0.090 (0.024)∗∗∗ −0.038 (0.048) 0.145 (0.045)∗∗∗
Neuroticism 0.014 (0.023) 0.005 (0.050) 0.014 (0.041)
Conscientiousness −0.007 (0.023) −0.042 (0.049) 0.032 (0.044)
Extraversion 0.037 (0.025) 0.097 (0.049)∗∗ −0.026 (0.043)
Correct optimistic −0.070 (0.117) 0.023 (0.178) −0.288 (0.180)
Correct same −1.197 (0.096)∗∗∗ −1.288 (0.166)∗∗∗ −0.703 (0.129)∗∗∗
Correct pessimistic 0.427 (0.209)∗∗ 0.024 (0.307) 0.502 (0.247)∗∗∗
Change in interviewer 0.085 (0.029)∗∗∗ 0.098 (0.041)∗∗ 0.041 (0.039)
Total number of problems −0.103 (0.138) 0.136 (0.208) −0.531 (0.217)∗∗
Other present in interview −0.015 (0.031) −0.002 (0.042) −0.047 (0.041)
Length of interview 0.064 (0.065) 0.080 (0.088) 0.096 (0.099)
Constant term 0.095 (0.101) 0.529 (0.193)∗∗∗ 0.177 (0.234)
Random e¤ects
σ2q 0.324 (0.038)
∗∗∗
σ2w 0.117 (1.513e+ 04)
σ2b 0.111 (0.044)
∗∗
Note: Coe¢cients are reported with standard errors in parenthesis; ∗ signicant at 10% level; ∗∗ signicant
at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level.
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Table 5: Modelling Financial Expectations  GMIOPC Model Marginal E¤ects
Overall marginal e¤ects Marginal e¤ects of ination equations only
worse o¤ about the same better o¤ worse o¤ (w∗i ) better o¤ (b
∗
i )
Aged 18-30 0.012 (0.012) −0.162 (0.023)∗∗∗ 0.150 (0.025)∗∗∗ 0.054 (0.072) −0.140 (0.019)∗∗∗
Aged 31-40 0.008 (0.009) −0.049 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.049 (0.017)∗∗∗ 0.195 (0.060)∗∗∗ −0.038 (0.015)∗∗
Aged 41-50 −0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.014) 0.001 (0.015) 0.132 (0.048)∗∗∗ 0.008 (0.010)
Male 0.010 (0.007) −0.041 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.030 (0.013)∗∗∗ −0.084 (0.035)∗∗∗ −0.042 (0.009)∗∗∗
Degree 0.019 (0.013) −0.084 (0.025)∗∗∗ 0.065 (0.025)∗∗∗ −0.023 (0.070) −0.085 (0.018)∗∗∗
Teaching/Nursing −0.012 (0.010) −0.043 (0.021)∗∗ 0.055 (0.022)∗∗∗ 0.082 (0.064) −0.024 (0.015)
A-level 0.002 (0.012) −0.042 (0.024)∗ 0.040 (0.024)∗ 0.051 (0.072) −0.035 (0.016)∗∗
O-level −0.015 (0.011) −0.013 (0.023) 0.028 (0.023) 0.120 (0.067)∗ 0.003 (0.016)
Other education −0.014 (0.013) 0.016 (0.028) −0.002 (0.027) 0.209 (0.075)∗∗∗ 0.026 (0.021)
Agreeableness −0.004 (0.005) 0.003 (0.009) 0.001 (0.011) 0.030 (0.018)∗ 0.006 (0.005)
Openness to experience −0.001 (0.004) −0.029 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.031 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.058 (0.017)∗∗∗ −0.022 (0.005)∗∗∗
Neuroticism 0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.011) −0.005 (0.008) −0.005 (0.016) −0.004 (0.004)
Conscientiousness 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.010) −0.006 (0.010) −0.012 (0.018) 0.001 (0.004)
Extraversion 0.001 (0.004) −0.013 (0.011) 0.013 (0.011) 0.001 (0.017) −0.001 (0.004)∗∗∗
Number of children −0.008 (0.002)∗∗∗ −0.009 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.018 (0.004)∗∗∗
Married 0.013 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.015 (0.005)∗∗∗ −0.028 (0.009)∗∗∗
White 0.028 (0.030) 0.030 (0.033) −0.058 (0.062)
Black −0.028 (0.048) −0.030 (0.053) 0.057 (0.098)
Asian 0.029 (0.037) 0.032 (0.042) −0.061 (0.078)
Employed 0.028 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.030 (0.008)∗∗∗ −0.058 (0.015)∗∗∗
Self employed −0.003 (0.009) −0.003 (0.009) 0.006 (0.019)
Unemployed −0.063 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.069 (0.014)∗∗∗ 0.132 (0.021)∗∗∗
Owned outright 0.029 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.032 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.061 (0.017)∗∗∗
Mortgage 0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.008) −0.009 (0.015)
Rent 0.013 (0.008) 0.014 (0.009) −0.027 (0.017)
Log labour income 0.028 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.031 (0.012)∗∗∗ −0.059 (0.022)∗∗∗
Log non-labour income 0.021 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.023 (0.010)∗∗ −0.044 (0.020)∗∗
Log savings 0.040 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.044 (0.008)∗∗∗ −0.084 (0.014)∗∗∗
Log wealth 0.033 (0.021) 0.036 (0.023) −0.069 (0.044)
GHQ-12 0.029 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.031 (0.006)∗∗∗ −0.060 (0.010)∗∗∗
Job satisfaction −0.008 (0.001)∗∗∗ −0.009 (0.001)∗∗∗ 0.017 (0.002)∗∗∗
Regional UE −0.002 (0.011) −0.003 (0.013) 0.005 (0.024)
Time trend −0.143 (0.020)∗∗∗ −0.156 (0.025)∗∗∗ 0.299 (0.040)∗∗∗
Error it −0.021 (0.003)
∗∗∗
−0.023 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.045 (0.006)∗∗∗
Income up −0.064 (0.006)∗∗∗ −0.070 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.133 (0.011)∗∗∗
Income down −0.011 (0.008) −0.012 (0.009) 0.023 (0.017)
Expenditure up 0.053 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.057 (0.008)∗∗∗ −0.110 (0.014)∗∗∗
Expenditure down −0.054 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.059 (0.011)∗∗∗ 0.112 (0.019)∗∗∗
Error it×Income up −0.008 (0.006) −0.009 (0.006) 0.018 (0.012)
Error it×Income down −0.023 (0.007)
∗∗∗
−0.026 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.049 (0.014)∗∗∗
Error it×Expenditure up −0.018 (0.006)
∗∗∗
−0.020 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.038 (0.011)∗∗∗
Error it×Expenditure down 0.009 (0.011) 0.011 (0.012) −0.020 (0.022)
Correct optimistic −0.034 (0.021) 0.029 (0.035) 0.005 (0.036) 0.115 (0.072) 0.054 (0.024)∗∗
Correct same −0.083 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.340 (0.025)∗∗∗ −0.258 (0.025)∗∗∗ 0.280 (0.051)∗∗∗ 0.346 (0.025)∗∗∗
Correct pessimistic 0.059 (0.028)∗∗ −0.064 (0.059) 0.005 (0.061) −0.200 (0.098)∗∗ −0.104 (0.041)∗∗
Change in interviewer 0.005 (0.005) −0.024 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.020 (0.008)∗∗∗ −0.016 (0.016) −0.024 (0.006)∗∗∗
Total number of problems −0.062 (0.024) 0.035 (0.041) 0.027 (0.042) 0.211 (0.086)∗∗∗ 0.084 (0.028)∗∗∗
Other present in interview −0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.009) 0.001 (0.008) 0.018 (0.016) 0.009 (0.006)
Length of interview 0.011 (0.012) −0.027 (0.019) 0.016 (0.018) −0.038 (0.039) −0.031 (0.014)∗∗
Note: Marginal e¤ects are reported with standard errors in parenthesis; ∗ signicant at 10% level; ∗∗ signicant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level.
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Table 6: Summary Probabilities for the Panel GMIOPC Model
Category Sample proportion Overall Purged
worse o¤ 0.1066 0.094 0.324
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗
about the same 0.6098 0.635 0.216
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗
better o¤ 0.2836 0.271 0.459
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗
Amount(Middle-ination) 0.419
(0.047)∗∗∗
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level.
ing the probabilities solely associated with the underlying OP component of the GMIOPC
model. These probabilities e¤ectively purge or net-out any ination e¤ects. We estimate
the amount of middle-ination in the modeldenoted Amount (Middle-ination)as the
di¤erence between the overall predicted probability of choosing about the same and the cor-
responding purged amount. This quantity is then used to calculate the proportion of overall
about the same responses that is attributable to the e¤ects of model ination. Expressed as
a percentage, the GMIOPC model suggests that approximately 42% of the about the same
observations can be attributed to the impact of the ination equations and, furthermore,
this is statistically signicant. This nding points to a large proportion of middle responses
being attributable to the impact of model ination.
Figure A.2 in Appendix A plots the nancial expectations index (the shaded columns)
with values as dened above in Section 2 (bounded -1 to +1). We also provide density plots
of the linear predictions from the panel OP model (the red line) and the panel GMIOPC
model (the blue line), where the latter has been purged of the e¤ects of ination. It should
be noted that both linear predictions are not bounded to the -1 to +1 space. It is noticeable
that the linear prediction from the panel OP model has considerable ination at zero, as in
the underlying nancial expectations index. Conversely, once ination has been purged from
the linear prediction there is clear evidence of a shift in the distribution away from zero as
is apparent from the plot for the panel GMIOPC. For the linear prediction from the panel
GMIOPC model, responses have been steered away from the about the same category to
either being pessimistic or optimistic  although given the shift in theGMIOPC distribution
to the left hand side, compared to the alternative expectations indices, after purging ination
respondents are typically more pessimistic. This is not surprising given that 42% of the 61%
responding in the underlying nancial expectations index about the same was found to be
due to ination.
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Overall, our ndings point to the panel GMIOPC being an appropriate statistical frame-
work to model the nancial expectations of UK households, which as discussed below, has
important implications for accouting for patterns of household consumption expenditure
given that without accounting for ination respondents are typically over-optimistic, a nd-
ing consistent with the existing literature (Bovi 2009, Malmendier and Taylor 2015).
4 Modelling consumption expenditure
In this section, we explore the implications of applying the GMIOPC modelling approach
to nancial expectations for analysing the e¤ect of expectations on household expenditure
decisions. We focus on a sub-sample of individuals who are the head of household and are
asked questions regarding household expenditure. The prediction that consumer sentiment
or individual expectations a¤ect spending on consumer goods has been documented in a well
established literature, see the overview by Ludvigson (2004).
For instance, Mishkin et al. (1978) found the Index of Consumer Sentiment compiled
by the University of Michigans Survey Research Center to be e¤ective in accounting for US
consumer expenditure, particularly on consumer durables. Focusing on Dutch households
subjective expectations and realisations of future income, Giamboni et al. (2013) nd that
predictable income changes can explain changes in consumption. DeNardi et al. (2011)
focus on the behaviour of consumption during the Great Recession. The University of
Michigans Survey of Consumers is exploited with a view to accounting for the behaviour
of nominal expected income growth and inationary expectations. A notable nding is that
lower consumer income expectations play a considerable role in driving the observed fall in
aggregate US consumption during this period. In Burke and Ozdagli (2013), micro-data
from the RAND American Life Panel Survey, which contains detailed information about
expenditure on a wide range of both durable and non-durable goods is used to explore the
relationship between household ination expectations and consumer spending. Very little
support is found for the hypothesis that current consumer spending is caused by higher
expectations of ination.29
Following Brown and Taylor (2006), we investigate the relationship between nancial
expectations and consumption behaviour. In line with Browning et al. (2016), our focus lies
29Puri and Robinson (2007) use the Survey of Consumer Finances to explore the relationship between
expectations, in particular optimism, and a number of economic outcomes including nancial behaviour. For
example, they nd that more optimistic people save more, although their analysis is based on repeated cross
sections and hence they are unable to account for panel e¤ects. In contrast, Coco et al. (2019) using the
BHPS nd that after controlling for individual xed e¤ects more optimistic individuals save less.
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on demand for household durable goods. Specically, we explore the determinants of the
probability of purchasing di¤erent goods as well as the level of expenditure undertaken. We
also split the analysis by investigating these e¤ects on expenditure relating to both household
appliances and consumer electronic goods.30 In contrast to Browning et al. (2016), nancial
expectations are included in the set of explanatory variables. The aim of the analysis is
to ascertain the e¤ect of nancial expectations on each expenditure outcome, in terms of
the likelihood of purchase and the amount spent on durable goods. We compare the e¤ects
of the original expectations index, with its linear prediction from a panel OP model and
its prediction from the panel GMIOPC modelling approach (where in the latter the linear
prediction is purged of the e¤ects of any ination). In the following, we rstly introduce the
expenditure/consumption data and the empirical methodology, followed by the results from
modelling expenditure.
4.1 Data and econometric strategy
In each year of the BHPS, information is available on household expenditure on durable
goods in the previous year, where from 1991 those individuals who are the head of the
household are asked whether any of the following items were purchased: (1) colour televi-
sion; (2) VCR; (3) freezer ; (4) washing machine; (5) tumble dryer ; (6) dish washer ; (7)
microwave; (8) home computer ; and (9) CD player. From 1997 onwards, the categories were
expanded to include the following items: (10) satellite dish; (11) cable TV ; (12) telephone;
and (13) mobile phone. For each type of good purchased, the head of household was asked,
How much in total have you paid for this, excluding interest paid on loans? Clearly, the
data does not include all types of consumption expenditure but it does serve as a proxy
for consumption. Following Browning et al. (2016), we consider expenditure on white good
household appliances (freezers, microwaves, dishwashers, washing machines and tumble dry-
ers) and expenditure on consumer electronics (personal computers, CD players, TVs, VCRs,
phones, cable TV and satellite dishes).
We estimate models of the following form, as a dynamic specication, as outlined below,
but also, for comparison purposes, as a static model with γ = 0 and αi = α0:
Egit = γE
g
it−1 + s
′
itλ+ φeyit + αi + νit (10)
30Browning et al. (2016) nd that purchases of consumer electronics typically rise with age, whilst, in
contrast, the demand for household appliances is relatively at.
24
αi = α0 + α1E
g
i0 + s
′
iπ + ωit (11)
The dependent variable, Egit , is either binary (modelled as a correlated random e¤ects
probit model) or the natural logarithm of the amount of expenditure (modelled as a corre-
lated random e¤ects tobit model) for group g. The groups we consider are: g = all goods,
electronics, white good appliances; or g = 1,2,. . . ,13, i.e. denoting each specic type of
durable good. In the dynamic specications, the correlation between the xed e¤ect, αi, and
the lagged dependent variable, Egit−1, yields an endogeneity problem, which will result in
inconsistent estimates. We follow Wooldridge (2005) and specify the xed e¤ect in equation
(10) conditional on the initial state, Egi0, i.e. whether the household purchases good g (or
the amount spent) when rst observed in the panel, and the group means of time varying
covariates, si, i.e. Mundlak (1978) xed e¤ects, as shown in equation (11). Substitution
of equation (11) into (10) yields an augmented random e¤ects model. State dependence is
explored in terms of the statistical signicance of Egit−1 and the magnitude of γ.
The set of control variables in sit draws on the existing literature, e.g. Browning et al.
(2016), and includes both household and head of household charateristics. Our particular
interest lies in the head of households nancial expectations index eyit, which as described
in Section 2, corresponds to the choice set eyi = {−1, 0, 1}. In alternative specications, it is
replaced by its linear prediction from a panel OP model and its linear prediction from the
panel GMIOPC modelling approach. In order to make the magnitude of nancial expecta-
tions comparable across the di¤erent estimators we standardise each measure to have a zero
mean and standard deviation of unity. Our main focus is on the estimate of φ in terms of its
sign, magnitude and statistical signicance, and whether the e¤ects di¤er once ination has
been purged from the measure of expectations. Other head of household charateristics com-
prise: a quartic in age; a quadratic in year of birth cohort; the number of health problems
reported; labour market status (i.e. whether an employee, self-employed or unemployed,
where out of the labour market is the omitted category). Household characteristics include
the number of children aged 0-2, 3-4, 5-11, 12-15, and 16-18; the number of adults in the
household; and the natural logarithm of household income.
Summary statistics for the variables used in the expenditure models are reported in
Table A.2 in Appendix A. Over the period, approximately 40% of respondents purchased
electronic goods and 24% purchased household appliances, whilst the respective amounts
spent were £350.85 and £189.59. The most common types of expenditure are on televisions,
VCRs and computers, with each at around 12%. Whilst the BHPS has information on
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whether household and electronic goods were purchased from 1991 onwards, information on
the amount spent on each type of good is only recorded from 1997 onwards (the amount
spent is deated to 1991 prices). Hence, when modelling expenditure, the sample sizes for
the static and dynamic models are 9,107 and 7,810, respectively. However, we do have
information on the total amount of expenditure on all durable goods for the full period. On
average, households purchase one durable good per year, 47% do not undertake expenditure
on durables, whilst 4% purchase four or more products. For the two broad categories of
electronic goods and household appliances, when considering the likelihood of purchase, the
sample sizes for the static and dynamic models are 12,629 and 11,270, respectively.
4.2 Estimation results
The results are presented in Tables 7 to 9. Table 7 focuses on the log of total expenditure
on all durable goods, and the log amount spent on electronics and household appliances in
the static and dynamic frameworks, whilst Table 8 focuses on the probability of incurring
expenditure on any durable good, which is then decomposed into electronics and household
appliances for both the static and dynamic models. In Table 9, static models are estimated
for each of the 13 types of expenditure. In each of the tables, Panel A presents the full results
when nancial expectations, eyit, are treated as exogenous. In Panels B and C of each table,
nancial expectations, eyit, are replaced by the linear prediction from: a panel OP model and
the panel GMIOPC model (where in the latter the linear prediction is net of ination). Due
to the inclusion of a generated variable, we follow Krinsky and Robb (1986) in calculating the
standard errors.31 Each alternative measure of nancial expectations has been standardised
enabling us to compare the magnitude across each specication (i.e. Panels A to C).
With respect to the amount of expenditure (see Table 7, Panel A), focusing on all durable
goods (the rst two columns), there is clear evidence of life cycle e¤ects in the static model,
this is driven by the e¤ect of age upon household appliances (see Table 7, nal two columns)
whilst there is no evidence of life cycle e¤ects on the level expenditure undertaken upon
electronic goods.32 In contrast, there is no association between age and the likelihood of
purchasing household appliances, see Table 8, yet life cycle e¤ects are apparent for the
probability of purchasing electronic goods (albeit only in the static framework). This reects
31The results based on the Krinsky and Robb (1986) standard errors are very similar to those derived via
the delta method.
32Whilst Browning et al. (2016) nd evidence of life cycle e¤ects in modelling the amount of expenditure
on electrical goods, their sample size is much larger as it is based upon an unbalanced panel. Moreover, their
estimation framework di¤ers substantially to ours and also they do not account for dynamics. Furthermore,
we also consider consumption at the intensive and extensive margins.
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the di¤erent e¤ects covariates can have at the intensive and extensive margins.
We also control for household size and family composition as the literature suggests that
these factors a¤ect the demand for durables, see, e.g., Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2005), and Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007). Household size only inuences the
likelihood of expenditure on durable goods in the static models (see Table 8). Interestingly,
focusing on the dynamic models, the number of children in the household has no e¤ect on
the likelihood of purchasing or the amount spent on household appliances. Conversely, for
electronic goods, the key child ages are ve and above, with the e¤ects increasing monoton-
ically for both the likelihood and the amount spent on electronic goods (see Tables 7 and
8).
In the dynamic models, typically there is no e¤ect of employment status on durable good
expenditure or the probability of purchase, although there is some evidence that individuals
who are self-employed are more likely to purchase household appliances and also spend
more (albeit only reaching statistical signicance at the 10 per cent level). In general, the
number of health problems is positively associated with both the likelihood and the amount of
expenditure for both electronics and household appliances, which is consistent with Browning
et al. (2016) for the amount spent on electronics.
With respect to the dynamic models, a 1% increase in household income increases the
probability of spending on electronics (household appliances) by approximately 2 (3) per-
centage points (see Table 8). However, in the case of both types of goods, the amount spent
is inelastic (see Table 7), a nding consistent with the results of Bachmann et al. (2015) for
the US. Specically, a 1% increase in household income is associated with an increase in ex-
penditure on electronics (household appliances) by 0.18% (0.15%), see Table 7. The demand
for household appliances is found to be more income inelastic than electronic goods, which is
consistent with such products being necessities, for example, a washing machine or a freezer
versus a home computer or a satellite TV. From the dynamic models, there is clear evidence
of state dependence in both the likelihood of making a purchase and the amount spent for
all durable goods, as well as by the type of good purchased. For example, it is apparent from
Table 7 that the e¤ect of the amount of expenditure in the previous year is inelastic and
is approximately 24% (86%) of the income e¤ect for electronic purchases (household appli-
ances). The probability of having purchased electronic goods (household appliances) in the
previous period increases the probability of buying electronic goods (household appliances)
by 5.0 (5.5) percentage points, see Table 8.
We now turn to the e¤ect of nancial expectations on the amount spent (Table 7) and on
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the likelihood of undertaking expenditure (Table 8), on electronics and household appliances.
Interestingly, there is no association between nancial expectations and the amount spent on
household white goods in either the static or dynamic frameworks, see Table 7. However, fo-
cusing on the amount spent on all durable goods and electronic goods, Table 7 Panel A shows
that the exogenous expectations index is positively associated with the level of expenditure,
and that, under the dynamic framework, the magnitude of the e¤ect is moderated compared
to the static model. In the dynamic model a one standard deviation increase in nancial
expectations is associated with around a 0.17% increase in the amount spent on electronic
goods. The nding that optimistic expectations regarding future income are generally pos-
itively associated with consumption expenditure is consistent with Bachmann et al. (2015)
and Gillitzer and Prasad (2018).33 ,34 From the corresponding analysis for the likelihood of
purchasing goods, see Table 8 Panel A, it is apparent that the exogenous index of nancial
expectations is only associated with expenditure on electronic goods. Specically, in the
dynamic model a one standard deviation increase in nancial expectations is associated with
a 3.63 percentage point higher probability of purchasing an electronic product.
The majority of the literature to date, which has explored the relationship between ex-
pectations and household nancial behaviour (such as saving, debt and consumption expen-
diture), has largely treated expectations as exogenous. However, it is di¢cult to argue that
consumption decisions are made independently from expectations regarding future income.
Consequently, in Panels B and C of Tables 7 and 8, we use the linear prediction from the
alternative models of expectations (a panel OP model and a panel GMIOPC model where
expectations are purged of ination). Each measure is standardised and so the e¤ect of nan-
cial expectations can be compared across panels. Again, as found in Panel A of Tables 7 and
8, the results show throughout each panel that the linear prediction of nancial expectations
is positively associated with the amount spent on durable goods and the likelihood of pur-
chase. Moreover, for both the amount spent (Table 7) and the likelihood of purchase (Table
8), the magnitude is smaller for the measure of expectations based upon the linear prediction
derived from the panel GMIOPC model (Panel C) compared to the measure based on the
linear prediction of expectations from the panel OP model (Panel B). For example, focusing
33Bachmann et al. (2015) explore the relationship between ination expectations and households readiness
to purchase consumption goods, using the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Gillitzer and Prasad (2018) con-
sider the e¤ect of consumer sentiment (which includes expectations regarding future income) on consumption
in Australia.
34In related work, Souleles (2004) shows using US data from the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment
that sentiment helps to forecast consumption growth, whilst Giamboni et al. (2013) using Dutch micro data
from the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) Household Survey nd that agents who are overly optimistic have
lower consumption growth.
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on expenditure on all goods a one standard deviation increase in nancial expectations is
associated with an increase in the amount spent by approximately 0.12% and 0.09% (see
Table 7 Panels B and C). Similarly, considering the likelihood of purchasing durable goods
a one standard deviation increase in nancial expectations is associated with a 2.4 and 1.8
percentage point higher probability of purchasing a durable good (see Table 8 Panels B and
C). Hence, once ination e¤ects have been purged from predicted nancial expectations the
impact on both the intensive and extensive margins of consumption is smaller, this is because
ination serves to shift the distribution of nancial expectations to the right (as is evident
from Figure A.2 in Appendix A).
In Table 9, the probability of purchasing each type of good is estimated in a static
framework.35 The sample covers 12,629 observations for goods (g =) 1 to 9, whilst for the
sub-sample which covers the remaining goods, there are 9,107 observations. The table is
constructed in the same way as Tables 7 and 8, but we only report the key parameter of
interest, i.e. the e¤ect associated with the standardised measure of nancial expectations,
φ. Whilst the association between expectations and the likelihood of expenditure is gener-
ally positive, it is only signicant for 6 of the 13 goods (see Panel A) and this is solely for
electronic goods, i.e.: VCR; home computer; CD player; satellite dish; cable TV and mobile
phone. Panels B and C relate to the standardised linear prediction of nancial expectations,
where, for the aforementioned goods, the positive relationship generally remains. Moreover,
the e¤ect of the standardised linear prediction from the panel OP model on the probability
of undertaking expenditure on specic durable goods (see Panel B), where statistically sig-
nicant, is typically larger than that stemming from the exogenous expectations index (see
Panel A). But as found above, the e¤ect of nancial expectations upon the probability of
purchasing di¤erent types of durable goods is larger in terms of economic magnitude from
the panel OP compared to the panel GMIOPC specication, where in the latter ination
has been purged from the linear prediction.
In general, we have found that nancial expectations are signicantly associated with
consumption: specically, more optimistic individuals are more likely to purchase durable
goods and to incur greater expenditure. The results tie in with the existing literature,
which has found a role for expectations and sentiment indicators in predicting consumption,
e.g. Carroll et al. (1994), Brown and Taylor (2006), Ludvigson (2004), Bachmann et al.
(2015) and Gillitzer and Prasad (2018). The relationship between consumption and nancial
35It is unlikely that households purchase the same type of durable good, e.g. a washing machine, a TV
or a home computer, year on year. Hence, a dynamic framework does not seem appropriate when modelling
the probability of purchasing specic durable goods.
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Table 7: Log Amount of Expenditure
Type of Expenditure
All Goods Electronics Household Appliances
Panel A Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Lag dependent variable − 0.0478 (0.009)∗∗∗ − 0.0327 (0.018)∗ − 0.1363 (0.038)∗∗∗
Age 1.3127 (0.639)∗∗ 0.8749 (0.782) 1.0286 (0.830) 1.6495 (1.302) 1.6705 (0.604)∗∗∗ 1.2583 (0.624)∗∗
Age2 −0.0513 (0.023)∗∗ −0.0354 (0.028) −0.0778 (0.064) −0.0991 (0.079) −0.2509 (0.126)∗∗ −0.3458 (0.157)∗∗
Age3 0.0009 (0.000)∗∗ 0.0006 (0.004) 0.0012 (0.001) 0.0015 (0.001) 0.0039 (0.002)∗∗ 0.0054 (0.002)∗∗
Age4 −0.0000 (0.000)∗∗ −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000)∗∗ −0.0000 (0.000)∗∗
Year of birth 0.0815 (0.082) 0.1304 (0.091) 0.0978 (0.160) 0.3083 (0.212) 0.0617 (0.290) 0.3842 (0.383)
Year of birth2 −0.0003 (0.001) −0.0011 (0.001) −0.0009 (0.002) −0.0038 (0.002) −0.0003 (0.004) −0.0044 (0.005)
Household size 0.0677 (0.050) 0.0863 (0.053) 0.0892 (0.098) 0.1190 (0.106) 0.1532 (0.196) 0.3089 (0.211)
Children 0-2 −0.1114 (0.111) −0.1385 (0.121) −0.4382 (0.228)∗ −0.5733 (0.255)∗∗ −0.0362 (0.441) −0.0851 (0.488)
Children 3-4 −0.1170 (0.102) -0.0641 (0.109) −0.1312 (0.205) −0.0759 (0.228) 0.4945 (0.397) 0.5440 (0.438)
Children 5-11 0.2026 (0.061)∗∗∗ 0.1938 (0.065)∗∗∗ 0.2847 (0.124)∗∗ 0.2430 (0.136)∗ 0.2470 (0.245) 0.1803 (0.268)
Children 12-15 0.2624 (0.068)∗∗∗ 0.2811 (0.072)∗∗∗ 0.4297 (0.131)∗∗∗ 0.3771 (0.142)∗∗∗ 0.3014 (0.261) 0.2737 (0.282)
Children 16-18 0.3508 (0.118)∗∗∗ 0.3001 (0.120)∗∗∗ 0.4836 (0.207)∗∗ 0.5151 (0.221)∗∗∗ 0.6071 (0.414) 0.4710 (0.443)
Number of problems 0.0979 (0.038)∗∗∗ 0.1031 (0.040)∗∗∗ 0.1087 (0.047)∗∗ 0.1603 (0.076)∗∗ 0.2817 (0.140)∗∗ 0.4219 (0.152)∗∗∗
Employee 0.1545 (0.130) −0.0200 (0.139) −0.1056 (0.247) −0.1852 (0.269) 0.2351 (0.491) 0.4368 (0.539)
Self employed 0.2174 (0.173) 0.0467 (0.184) −0.2532 (0.332) −0.2768 (0.360) 1.1930 (0.668)∗ 1.3722 (0.715)∗
Unemployed −0.2150 (0.211) −0.3629 (0.228) −0.4600 (0.425) −0.4310 (0.460) −0.7159 (0.861) −0.4951 (0.941)
Log real household income 0.2203 (0.066)∗∗∗ 0.1984 (0.070)∗∗∗ 0.4170 (0.052)∗∗∗ 0.1826 (0.074)∗∗ 0.5364 (0.056)∗∗∗ 0.1504 (0.063)∗∗
Expectations index 1 (eyit) 0.0976 (0.054)
∗∗ 0.0973 (0.049)∗ 0.1955 (0.084)∗∗ 0.1739 (0.091)∗∗ 0.0651 (0.096) 0.0605 (0.104)
Panel B
Expectations index 2 0.1183 (0.035)∗∗∗ 0.1182 (0.034)∗∗∗ 0.2414 (0.067)∗∗∗ 0.2344 (0.069)∗∗∗ 0.1651 (0.126) 0.0940 (0.129)
Panel C
Expectations index 3 0.0771 (0.031)∗∗ 0.0866 (0.031)∗∗∗ 0.1491 (0.059)∗∗ 0.1311 (0.063)∗∗ 0.0473 (0.110) 0.0329 (0.116)
No. of observations 12, 629 11, 270 9, 107 7, 810 9, 107 7, 810
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported with standard errors in parenthesis; ∗ signicant at 10% level; ∗∗ signicant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level;
Expectations index 1 is based on exogenous nancial expectations; Expectations index 2 is the linear prediction from the panel OP model; and Expectations
index 3 uses the linear prediction from the panel GMIOPC model. Each index has been standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation of unity.
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Table 8: Probability of Expenditure
Type of Expenditure
All Goods Electronics Household Appliances
Panel A Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Lag dependent variable − 0.0590 (0.010)∗∗∗ − 0.0500 (0.010)∗∗∗ − 0.0550 (0.018)∗∗∗
Age 0.1955 (0.104)∗ 0.2043 (0.141) 0.1666 (0.081)∗∗ 0.2039 (0.140) 0.1009 (0.089) 0.1386 (0.122)
Age2 −0.0079 (0.004)∗∗ −0.0081 (0.005) −0.0065 (0.003)∗∗ −0.0075 (0.005) −0.0046 (0.003) −0.0056 (0.004)
Age3 0.0001 (0.000)∗∗ 0.0001 (0.000)∗ 0.0001 (0.000)∗∗ 0.0001 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.000)∗ 0.0000 (0.000)
Age4 −0.0000 (0.000)∗∗∗ −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000)∗∗ −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000)
Year of birth 0.0105 (0.006)∗ 0.0176 (0.016) 0.0077 (0.006) 0.0158 (0.016) 0.0090 (0.005)∗ 0.0099 (0.013)
Year of birth2 −0.0001 (0.000) −0.0001 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.001) −0.0000 (0.000) −0.0001 (0.000) −0.0000 (0.000)
Household size 0.0250 (0.007)∗∗ −0.0089 (0.010) 0.0220 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.0083 (0.009) 0.0152 (0.005)∗∗∗ −0.0025 (0.008)
Children 0-2 −0.0223 (0.019) −0.0124 (0.022) −0.0563 (0.018)∗∗∗ −0.0572 (0.022)∗∗∗ 0.0044 (0.015) 0.0253 (0.018)
Children 3-4 −0.0272 (0.017) −0.0015 (0.020) −0.0413 (0.017)∗∗ −0.0218 (0.019) 0.0115 (0.014) 0.0276 (0.019)
Children 5-11 0.0242 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.0403 (0.012)∗∗∗ 0.0164 (0.009)∗ 0.0303 (0.011)∗∗∗ 0.0079 (0.008) 0.0165 (0.010)
Children 12-15 0.0328 (0.012)∗∗∗ 0.0545 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.0291 (0.011)∗∗∗ 0.0465 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.0103 (0.009) 0.0153 (0.011)
Children 16-18 0.0220 (0.021) 0.0343 (0.022) 0.0279 (0.020) 0.0481 (0.021)∗∗∗ 0.0033 (0.017) 0.0109 (0.019)
Number of problems 0.0184 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.0149 (0.007)∗∗ 0.0144 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.0113 (0.007) 0.0123 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.0171 (0.006)∗∗∗
Employee 0.0515 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.0149 (0.024) 0.0300 (0.017)∗ −0.0014 (0.025) 0.0250 (0.015)∗ 0.0046 (0.022)
Self employed 0.0751 (0.023)∗∗∗ 0.0335 (0.033) 0.0462 (0.022)∗∗ 0.0206 (0.033) 0.0479 (0.019)∗∗ 0.0414 (0.029)
Unemployed −0.0250 (0.034) −0.0651 (0.041) 0.0001 (0.034) −0.0230 (0.040) −0.0128 (0.030) −0.0558 (0.037)
Log real household income 0.0440 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.0275 (0.012)∗∗ 0.0368 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.0215 (0.010)∗∗ 0.0252 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.0302 (0.012)∗∗∗
Expectations index 1 (eyit) 0.0246 (0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.0213 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.0396 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.0363 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.0003 (0.004) 0.0003 (0.004)
Panel B
Expectations index 2 0.0281 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.0240 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.0463 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.0429 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.0057 (0.006) 0.0051 (0.005)
Panel C
Expectations index 3 0.0213 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.0184 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.0310 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.0258 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.0021 (0.004) 0.0018 (0.004)
No. of observations 12, 629 11, 270 12, 629 11, 270 12, 629 11, 270
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported with standard errors in parenthesis; ∗ signicant at 10% level; ∗∗ signicant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level;
Expectations index 1 is based on exogenous nancial expectations; Expectations index 2 is the linear prediction from the panel OP model; and Expectations
index 3 uses the linear prediction from the panel GMIOPC model. Each index has been standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation of unity.
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Table 9: Probability of Expenditure Models Random E¤ects Probit  Detailed Expenditure Iterms
TV VCR Freezer Washing Tumble Dish Microwave PC CD Satellite Cable Telephone Mobile
machine dryer washer player dish TV phone
Panel A
Expectations index 1 (eyit) 0.0029 0.0194 0.0023 0.0023 0.0017 −0.0022 −0.0001 0.0190 0.0176 0.0091 0.0041 0.0023 0.0026
(0.003) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.002) (0.001)∗∗
Panel B
Expectations index 2 0.0036 0.0270 0.0008 0.0063∗ 0.0023 0.0001 −0.0009 0.0245 0.0227 0.0121 0.0043 0.0186 0.0045
(0.004) (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗
Panel C
Expectations index 3 0.0025 0.0126 -0.0003 0.0015 0.0016 -0.0004 −0.0032 0.0121 0.0104 0.0088 0.0039 0.0167 0.0026
(0.007) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
No. of observations 12, 629 9, 107
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported with standard errors in parenthesis; ∗ signicant at 10% level; ∗∗ signicant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signicant at 1% level;
Expectations index 1 is based on exogenous nancial expectations; Expectations index 2 is the linear prediction from the panel OP model; and Expectations
index 3 uses the linear prediction from the panel GMIOPC model. Each index has been standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation of unity.
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expectations is still evident when we relax the assumption that expectations are exogenous.
The analysis reveals that nancial expectations have a positive impact on both the
amount of expenditure undertaken and the decision to purchase a product, although this
is typically limited to electronic goods. The linear prediction from a panel OP model over-
estimates the e¤ect of nancial expectations on consumption both at the intenstive and
extensive margin. This is due to the fact that once expectations have been purged of the
e¤ects of ination (as in the panel GMIOPC modelling approach) they are found to have a
smaller impact on the amount spent and the decision to undertake expenditure on durable
goods. This is as expected a priori, given that the linear prediction from the panel GMIOPC
model has been purged of the e¤ects of ination, the impact of which is to steer responses
towards the about the same category, and away from being worse o¤ or better o¤.
5 Conclusion
The BHPS reveals that households often report that they expect their nancial position
to remain unchanged compared to other alternatives. Given that the distribution of this
response variable is characterised by middle-ination, our statistical approach has been to
model individuals nancial expectations using a panel GMIOPC model. In doing so, we
account for the common tendency of individuals to choose a neutral response when con-
fronted with this type of survey question. Our empirical analysis strongly supports the use
of a panel GMIOPC model to account for this response pattern and indices generated using
both exogenous and endogenous nancial expectations are found to play a non-neligible role
in driving household consumption behaviour. In contrast to previous contributions that have
explored the relationship between expectations and household nancial behaviour, we devi-
ate from the commonly used approach in which nancial expectations are treated as being
exogenous. Central to our approach is the argument that if nancial expectations are endoge-
nous, it is essential that they are modelled appropriately. Appropriately taking into account
the endogenous nature of nancial expectations clearly matters, in that although nancial
optimism is signicantly associated with greater consumption, indices which neglect the role
of middle-ination overstate the impact of nancial expectations on household consumption.
Considering the amount of expenditure (probability of purchase) on durable goods, the over-
estimate from the panel OP model compared to the panel GMIOPC is approximately 36%
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(30%).36
Given the importance in the academic literature placed on using expectations and sen-
timent indicators to predict household consumption and other forms of household nancial
behaviour, our ndings have potentially important implications for future research in this
area. Moreover, there are also potential policy implications given that govenment media
presence and changes in scal policy through tax cuts have been found to impact upon
economic activity and consumer expectations (He 2017, Konstantinou and Tagkalakis 2011,
Goidel et al. 2010). Therefore, it is important when considering any intended manipulation
of consumer sentiment through policy intervention that expectations are accurately mea-
sured and purged of ination e¤ects (which are substantial in the case of the UK), otherwise
the predicted e¤ects on economic activity are likely to be erroneous.
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A Summary statistics and gures
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Figure A.1: Distribution of nancial expectations  BHPS 1992 to 2008
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Figure A.2: Alternative measures of nancial expectations  distribution of the exogenous
expectations (eyit) index and density plots of linear predictions from the panel OP model and
the panel GMIOPC model
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Table A.1: Variable Denitions  Financial Expectations Models
Mean Std.Dev
eyit Financial expectations {-1=pessimistic; 0=no change; 1=optimistic} 0.1770 0.599
Aged 18-30 1=aged 18-30; 0=otherwise 0.1320 0.339
Aged 31-40 1=aged 31-40; 0=otherwise 0.3156 0.465
Aged 41-50 1=aged 41-50; 0=otherwise 0.3353 0.472
Male 1=male; 0=female 0.4488 0.497
Degree 1=highest education degree; 0=otherwise 0.1659 0.372
Teaching/Nursing 1=highest education teaching or nursing; 0=otherwise 0.3252 0.469
A-level 1=highest education A-level; 0=otherwise 0.1176 0.322
O-level 1=highest education O-level (GCSE); 0=otherwise 0.1939 0.395
Other education 1=highest education other qualication; 0=otherwise 0.0800 0.271
Agreeableness BIG5 agreeableness (standardised) 0 1
Openness to experience BIG5 openness to experience (standardised) 0 1
Neuroticism BIG5 neuroticism (standardised) 0 1
Conscientiousness BIG5 conscientiousness (standardised) 0 1
Extraversion BIG5 extraversion (standardised) 0 1
Number of children Number of children 0-5 0.8022 1.019
Married 1=married/cohabiting; 0=otherwise 0.8159 0.388
White 1=white; 0=otherwise 0.9753 0.155
Black 1=black; 0=otherwise 0.0056 0.075
Asian 1=asian; 0=otherwise 0.0134 0.115
Employed 1=employee; 0=otherwise 0.7402 0.439
Self employed 1=self employed; 0=otherwise 0.0825 0.275
Unemployed 1=unemployed; 0=otherwise 0.0193 0.137
Owned outright 1=home owned outright; 0=otherwise 0.1747 0.379
Mortgage 1=home owned via a mortgage; 0=otherwise 0.6797 0.467
Rent 1=home rented; 0=otherwise 0.0721 0.259
Log labour income Natural logarithm of labour income last month 0.6759 0.198
Log non-labour income Natural logarithm of non-labour income last month 0.4022 0.203
Log savings Natural logarithm of saving last month 0.2345 0.255
Log wealth Natural logarithm of wealth 1.1481 0.146
GHQ-12 General Health Questionnaire  caseness 0.1772 0.292
Job satisfaction Job security; 0=not employed, 1=not satised,...,7=completely satised 4.2991 2.478
Regional UE Natural logarithm of regional unemployment 0.6575 0.242
Errorit {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2} = subjective expectation (eyit−1)  subjective realisation (Rit) 0.1266 0.821
Income up 1=nancial situation income increased; 0=otherwise 0.2012 0.401
Income down 1=nancial situation income decreased; 0=otherwise 0.0795 0.271
Expenditure up 1=nancial situation expenditure increased, 0=otherwise 0.1130 0.317
Expenditure down 1=nancial situation expenditure decreased, 0=otherwise 0.0429 0.203
Correct optimistic Number of times correctly optimistic 0.1227 0.171
Correct same Number of times correctly same 0.0467 0.100
Correct pessimistic Number of times correctly pessimistic 0.2380 0.231
Change in interviewer 1=change in interviewer between waves; 0=otherwise 0.3009 0.459
Total number of problems Number of problems a¤ecting interview; 0-2 0.0091 0.103
Other present in interview 1=others present during interview; 0=otherwise 0.6391 0.480
Length of interview Interview time in minutes (divided by 100) 0.4756 0.197
Notes: Sample all individuals; NT = 24,089; N=1,417.
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Table A.2: Variable Denitions  Expenditure Models
Mean Std.Dev
All durables 1=durable goods brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.5278 0.499
Electronics 1=electronic goods brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.3969 0.489
Household appliances 1=household appliances brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.2356 0.424
Log total expenditure Natural logarithm of amount spent on all durable goods last year 3.2994 3.137
Log electronics# Natural logarithm of amount spent on electronic items last year 2.5344 3.133
Log household appliances# Natural logarithm of amount spent on household appliances last year 1.4906 2.708
TV 1=colour tv brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.1268 0.333
VCR 1=vcr brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.1172 0.321
Freezer 1=freezer brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0760 0.265
Washing machine 1=washing machine brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0930 0.290
Tumble dryer 1=tumble dryer brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0416 0.200
Dish washer 1=dish washer brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0456 0.209
Microwave 1=microwave brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0653 0.247
PC 1=pc brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.1192 0.324
CD player 1=cd player brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0783 0.269
Satellite dish 1=satellite dish brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0311 0.174
Cable TV 1=cable tv brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0121 0.109
Telephone 1=telephone brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0709 0.257
Mobile phone 1=mobile phone brought in last year; 0=otherwise 0.0243 0.154
Age Age of individual at date of interview 42.9164 9.815
Year of birth Year of birth of individual 1958 9.831
Household size Number of adults in household 1.9242 0.305
Children 0-2 Number of children in household aged 0-2 0.0768 0.276
Children 3-4 Number of children in household aged 3-4 0.0882 0.295
Children 5-11 Number of children in household aged 5-11 0.3695 0.691
Children 12-15 Number of children in household aged 12-15 0.2184 0.499
Children 16-18 Number of children in household aged 16-18 0.0499 0.230
Number of problems Number of health problems 0.8905 1.108
Employee 1=employee; 0=otherwise 0.7641 0.425
Self employed 1=self employed; 0=otherwise 0.1074 0.310
Unemployed 1=unemployed; 0=otherwise 0.0224 0.148
Log real household income Natural logarithm of annual income last year 10.4568 0.759
Notes: Sample heads of household only; NT = 12,629; #NT = 9,107.
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B The likelihood function for the panel GMIOP model
In the analysis that follows, we analyse panel data: that is, for each individual i, we have
repeated observations over time periods t = 1, . . . , Ti. Given the assumed form for the prob-
abilities and an independent and identically distributed sample of size i = 1, . . . , N from
the population on (yi, zi,xi), this satises all of the standard regularity conditions for maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (see Greene 2012). The full parameter set θ =

γ
′
,β
′
,′,ρ′

′
of
the model can be consistently and e¢ciently estimated using standard maximum likelihood
techniques, with the likelihood function given by
logL (θ) =
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
J=+1X
j=−1
ditj log [Pr (yit = j |xi, zi )] (B.1)
where ditj is the indicator function, 1 [yitj = j] and j = −1, 0,+1. Formulating the above
model in this context allows one to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the
underlying equations, α, and as is standard in the literature it is assumed that α ∼ N (0,Σ)
with the individual elements of Σ denoted by ey∗, w∗ and b∗, respectively. The presence of
such unobserved e¤ects complicates evaluation of the resulting likelihood function and hence
we utilise the method of maximum simulated likelihood. Dening vi as a vector of standard
normal random variates, which enter the model generically as Γvi, such that for a single draw
of vi, Γvi = (αi,ey∗ , αi,w∗ , αi,b∗), where Γ is the chol (Σ) and Σ = ΓΓ
′. Conditioned on vi, the
sequence of Ti outcomes for individual i are independent, such that the contribution to the
likelihood function for a group of t observations is dened as the product of the sequence of
the probabilities which we denote ci, corresponding to the observed outcome of yi, ci | vi,
ci | vi =
TiY
t=1
J=+1Y
j=−1
[Pr (yit = j |xi, zi,vi )]ditj (B.2)
The unconditional log-likelihood function is found by integrating out the vi as
logL(θ) =
NX
i=1
log
Z
vi
TiY
t=1
J=+1Y
j=−1
[Pr (yit = j |xi, zi,Γvi )] f(vi)dvi, (B.3)
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where all parameters of the model are contained in θ. Using the usual assumption of multi-
variate normality for vi yields
logL(θ) =
NX
i=1
log
Z
vi
TiY
t=1
J=+1Y
j=−1
[Pr (yit = j |xi, zi,Γvi )]
KY
k=1
φ(vik)dvik, (B.4)
where k indexes the di¤erent unobserved e¤ects in the model. The expected values in the
integrals can be evaluated by simulation by drawing R observations on vi from the multi-
variate standard normal population. The following is the resulting simulated log-likelihood
function
logS L(θ) =
NX
i=1
log
1
R
RX
r=1
TiY
t=1
J=+1Y
j=−1
[Pr (yit = j |xi, zi,Γvi )] . (B.5)
Halton sequences of length R = 1000 were used, see Train (2009), and this now feasible
function is maximized with respect to θ. As is common in the non-linear panel data literature,
given that these unobserved heterogeneity terms are (potentially) correlated with observed
heterogeneity terms, the correction proposed by Mundlak (1978) is applied. Consequently,
we include averages of the continuous covariates of individual i in the set of explanatory
variables, xi =
1
Ti
PTi
t=1 xit.
C A Specication test for the MIOP model
The GMIOP and the MIOP models both present themselves as viable candidates for mod-
elling the preponderance of about the same responses: each model is seemingly able to
account for the observed spike in nancial expectations responses. In what follows, we
demonstrate that under certain parameter restrictions, the GMIOPC model encompasses
the MIOPC. This permits us to ascertain if the propensities for better o¤ or worse o¤ re-
sponses are tempered to the same extent: formally, does βw = βb? In the correlated model
shown in expression (6), such a linear parameter restriction is testable by enforcing the
restriction that βw = βb = β and ρw = ρb = ρ. This yields
Pr (eyi) =


−1 = Φ2 (0 − z′iγ,x′sβs;−ρ)
0 =
[Φ (1 − z′iγ)− Φ (0 − z′iγ)] +
Φ2 (0 − z′iγ,− x′iβ; ρ) + Φ2 (1 − z′iγ,− x′iβ; ρ)
1 = [Φ2 (z
′
iγ−1,x′iβ; ρ)] .
(C.1)
44
where we note that rearranging the Pr (ey = 0) expression as 1 minus the sum of the Pr (ey = −1)
and Pr (ey = 1) terms of equation (C.1) gives
Pr (eyi = 0) = 1− Φ2 (0 − z′iγ,x′sβs;−ρ)− [Φ2 (z′iγ−1,x′iβ; ρ)] (C.2)
Noting that the termΦ2 (z
′
iγ−1,x′iβ; ρ) can be re-written asΦ (x′iβ)−Φ2 (1 − z′iγ,x′iβ;−ρ)
implies that Pr (eyi = 0) can be re-expressed as
Pr (eyi = 0) = [1− Φ (x′iβ)] + Φ2 (1 − z′iγ,x′iβ;−ρ) + Φ2 (0 − z′iγ,x′sβs;−ρ) (C.3)
Using this result yields the re-written restricted probabilities as
Pr (eyi) =


−1 = Φ2 (0 − z′iγ,x′sβs;−ρ)
0 = [1− Φ (x′iβ)] + Φ2 (1 − z′iγ,−x′iβw; ρ)− Φ2 (0 − z′iγ,−x′iβw; ρ)
1 = [Φ2 (z
′
iγ−1,x′iβ; ρ)]
(C.4)
which is identical to the model probabilities for the MIOPC (see for instance: Bagozzi and
Mukherjee (2012); Brooks, Harris, and Spencer (2012)). The restricted form of the GMIOPC
model is thus equivalent to the MIOPC. That is, even though di¤erent inherent sequences
in the choice process are used to justify both models, they are equivalent under a simple set
of parameter restrictions. Further, setting βw = βb = β and ρ = 0 in (6) implies that the
GMIOPC collapses to a MIOP model with independent errors. In this case, the distribution
of errors would no longer be assumed bivariate normal, which characterises the MIOPC
model in expression (C.4). Testing the parameter restrictions associated with these model
variants entails testing (i) the more exible functional form of the GMIOPC model versus
the simpler nested forms of the MIOPC and MIOP models and (ii) the GMIOP versus the
MIOP model. As demonstrated in Brown et al. (2017), likelihood ratio tests with degrees
of freedom given by the number of extra parameters can be performed to test between these
nested model variants.
D Partial e¤ects
The partial e¤ects of the J = 3 outcomes are likely to be of interest post-estimation. For
a change in any given covariate, it is informative to determine how much of the change in
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the predicted probability for the inated variable is attributable to the tempering equations.
Below we present the associated analytical expressions for the GMIOPC model, where the
GMIOP variant merely requires setting ρyw = ρyb = 0. Partition the covariates and coe¢-
cient vectors as
z =

 cez

 , γ =

 γceγ

 , x =

 wex

 , βu =

 βcbeβb

 , βd =

 βcweβw

 (D.1)
where c represents the common variables that appear in both z and x, with the corresponding
coe¢cients γc, βcb and βcw for the ordered probit, better o¤, and worse o¤ latent equations
respectively. ez denotes the set of variables that appears solely in the the ordered equation
with associated coe¢cients eγ, whereas ex denotes the set of variables both common and
exclusive to the splitting equations, with associated coe¢cients eβb for better expectations
and eβw for worse expectations. Let x∗ = (c′,ez′, ex′)′, γ∗ = (γ ′c,eγ ′,0′)′, β∗b = (β′cb,0′, eβ′b)′ and
β∗w = (β
′
cw,0
′, eβ′w)′. The partial e¤ects with respect to x∗ of equation (6) are thus
∂ Pr (eyi = −1)
∂x∗
=


Φ


0
−z
′
iγ−ρyw(x
′
iβw)√
1−ρ2yw

φ (x′iβw)β
∗
w
−Φ

x
′
iβw−ρyw(0−z
′
iγ)√
1−ρ2yw

φ (0 − z′iγ)γ∗
(D.2)
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∂ Pr (eyi = 0)
∂x∗
=


φ (0 − z′iγ)γ∗

1− Φ

−x
′
iβw−ρyw(0−z
′
iγ)√
1−ρ2yw

+φ (1 − z′iγ)γ∗

Φ

−x
′
iβb−ρyb(z
′
iγ−u1)√
1−ρ2yb

− 1

+Φ

(0−z
′
iγ)−ρyw(−x
′
iβw)√
1−ρ2yw

φ (−x′iβw)β∗w
−Φ

(z′iγ−1)−ρyb(−x
′
iβb)√
1−ρ2yb

φ (−x′iβb)β∗b
(D.3)
∂ Pr (eyi = 1)
∂x∗
=


Φ

(z′iγ−1)−ρyb(x
′
iβb)√
1−ρ2yb

φ (x′iβb)β
∗
b
+Φ

x
′
iβb−ρyb(z
′
iγ−1)√
1−ρ2yb

φ (z′iγ − 1)γ∗
(D.4)
where φ(.) is the probability density function (PDF) of the standard univariate normal
distribution. Standard errors of the marginal e¤ects can be obtained by the delta method
(Greene 2012). Based on equation (6) several related quantities may be of interest. For
example, equation (6) can be di¤erentiated with respect to di¤erent subsets of x∗, which
would provide a decomposition of the overall partial e¤ect with respect to these blocks. The
various components of equations (D.2)(D.4) can also be considered.
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